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NOTES
* PROTECTION OF MEMBERS' INTERESTS IN FUNDS OF
UNINCORPORATED UNIONS
Labor union funds have assumed a position of influence in the na-
tion's economy.' With this expansion has come increased concern for
the propriety of their administration. Statutory regulation has often
been proposed as essential to the adequate protection of the rights of
union members in such funds.' Pressure has formed within organized
labor itself toward more effective internal control of financial adminis-
tration. The advent of trends toward legislation aimed at diminishing
the risk of capricious handling of labor union funds evidences distrust of
the adequacy of the common law to protect the interests of union mem-
bers without imposing unwarranted restrictions on officials to whom the
administration of union funds is entrusted. Realizing that the question
of members rights in control of union funds is fused with legislative
determinations of the degree of regulation to be imposed on labor unions
in general, the courts have stated a policy of non-intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of unions.3 The feeling has been that these problems are
better settled by legislative pronouncement. However, it has been recog-
nized that the desirability of non-interference is sometimes outweighed
by the serious consequences which flow from failing to restrict the of-
ficial.4
1. It was estimated that in 1953, more than $17 billion were lodged in union pen-
sion funds alone, with a net annual increase of $2 billion. Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, Monthly Review of Credit and Business Conditions, Dec. 1953, p. 187. As
of February 28, 1955, United Auto Workers had resources of $19,704,015.13, an increase
of $3,919,368.21 over the 1953 figure, Report of Emil Mazery, UAW secretary-treasurer
to the 1955 UAW convention, 35 L.R.R.M. 101 (1955). The United Mine Workers
Welfare Fund income for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957 was $157.1 million; funds
on hand $145.3 million; net gain $15.1 million. Newsweek, Sept. 13, 1957, p. 106.
2. Interim report of Ives subcommittee of the Senate Labor Committee Jan. 26,
1955 cited in 35 L.R.R.M. 43 (1955). Report, C.I.O. Standing Committee on Ethical
Practices May 4, 1955, discussed in 35 L.R.R.M. 183, 187 (1955). Professor Walter
Gellhorn of Columbia University in a speech before the Sidney Hillel Foundation lun-
cheon in New York April 30, 1957 suggested the creation by the labor movement as a
whole of a nationwide network of arbitration courts to provide impartial, quick and
cheap settlement of members' grievances against the union. 40 L.R.R. 8 (1957).
3. Harris v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 1 F.Supp. 946 (D.C. E.D. Ill.
1931). O'Neill v. United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers and Steamfitters of the
United States and Canada, 348 Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944). Some legislative regula-
tion has been imposed. A union seeking to gain access to the National Labor Relations
Board must file with the Secretary of Labor a copy of its constitution and by-laws,
names and salaries of officers, a financial report and show that such financial reports
are furnished to all members of the union. 61 Stat. 136, 9 f.)-g.), 29 U.S.C. 159 f.)-g.)
(1947).
4. Discussion of the scope of labor union power over individual members. Sum-
mers, Union Powers and Workers Rights, 49 MicrH. L. REv. 805, 816-37 (1951). For a dis-
cussion of labor unions as corporations and unincorporated associations, see ROTHENBERG,
LABOR RELATIONS c. VI (1949).
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Funds received by the local union through initiation fees, dues and
assessments are usually applied, at least in part, toward local expenses
such as rents and salaries of administrative officers. If the local is a
member of a national or international union, part is forwarded to the
central union. Special projects are sometimes financed by levying an
assessment or setting aside a portion of dues.5 The control of funds
collected from the members rests solely in the hands of union officials
and the documents which primarily determine their duties and liabilities
with respect to such funds are the constitutions and by-laws of the local
and international union. The constitution and by-laws of the local are
a contract between each member of the local and all other members of
the local.6 Likewise, the constitution and by-laws of the central union
constitute a contract between the local and its members and the central
union and its members.'
A union officer is often described as a fiduciary in respect to funds
collected from members of the union.' It has been said that such funds
are trust funds, or in the nature of trust funds.9 Patently, these terms are
not synonymous since different legal consequences flow from each, yet
the courts' use of them interchangeably demonstrates that difficulties are
encountered in clearly defining the power, nature and scope of the of-
ficial's obligation.
5. HARDMAN, "Dollar Worth" of the Unions in THE HOUSE OF LABOR 408, 410-11
(1951).
6. Constitution and By-laws which are part of membership contract define the
rights, privileges and duties of individual members. Low v. Harris, 90 F.2d 783 (7th
Cir. 1937) ; Hopson v. National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, 116 Cal.App.2d
253, 253 P.2d 733 (1953) ; Miller v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 85
Cal. App.2d 66, 257 P.2d 85 (1953) ; Cameron v. Durkin, 321 Mass. 590, 74 N.E.2d 671
(1947) ; Sullivan v. Barrows, 303 Mass. 197, 21 N.E.2d 275 (1939) ; Barnhart v. United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 12 N.J. Super.
147, 79 A.2d 88 (1951) ; Harris v. Geier, 112 N.J. Eq. 99, 164 Atl. 50 (1932) ; Walsche
v. Sherlock, 110 N.J.Eq. 223, 159 Atl. 661 (1932); Dakchoylous v. Ernst, 203 Misc.
207, 118 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1952), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 1101, 126 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1953) ; Pratt
v. Rudisule, 249 App. Div. 305, 292 N.Y.Supp. 68 (1936).
7. Harker v. McKissock, 7 N.J. 323, 81 A.2d 480 (1951) ; Cameron v. International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators of the United
States and Canada, Local Union No. 384, 119 N.J.Eq. 577, 183 Atl. 157 (1936) ; Alexion
v. Hollingsworth, 289 N.Y. 91, 43 N.E.2d 825 (1942) ; Nilon v. Colleron, 283 N.Y. Supp.
84, 27 N.E.2d 511 (1940) ; Polin v. Kaplin, 257 N.Y.Supp. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) ;
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America v. Garrett, 185 Misc.
61, 56 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1945) ; Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1951).
8. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 262 App. Div. 781, 27 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1941) ; 177 Misc. 35, 29
N.Y.S.2d 882 (1941); 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941); 178 Misc. 965, 37
N.Y.S.2d 750 (1942); Wortex Mills Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O.,
380 Pa. 3, 109 A.2d 815 (1954).
9. Local Union No. 720, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common La-
borers' Union of America v. Bednarsek, 119 Colo. 586, 205 P.2d 796 (1949). Inter-
national Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and Distillery Workers of
America, C.I.O. v. Becherer, 142 N.J.Eq. 561, 61 A.2d 16 (1948).
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If the official's fiduciary obligations exist apart "from any notion
of a trust fund, then the injection of the trust concept only serves to be-
cloud the real-nature of the relationship. It is well recognized that the
election or appointment of a union official creates an agency, the scope
of which is defined by the constitution, and -by-laws." . It- could then be
said that the union official as an agent owes to his principal the same
duties of good faith and honest effort as are owed by all agents to their
principals' . Although the agency relationship offers a possible source
for the "fiduciary" aspects of the offcial's duties, obstacles arise when
an attempt is made to apply the concept to the existing situation. Prob-
lems such as those which are encountered in attempting to define the
identity of the principal limit the utility of the agency relationship toward
affording a theoretically sound explanation of the source and scope of.
these fiduciary duties.
PARTIES BY REPRESENTATION
Most local unions are unincorporated associations and have no legal
existence apart from their membership; consequently,- unless permitted
by statute, no suit may be maintained by or against the local itself. 2
However, these statutes are designed to facilitate suits between the. un-
incorporated union and third persons and not to further the enforcement
of individual members' property interests in union funds. 3 The equitable
doctrine of parties by representation must generally be invoked to permit
the membership as a class' to bring suit' and the suit is usually a class
action in name only. While considerable unanimity of sentiment is often
demonstrated in actions against third persons, misappropriation' actions,
although called class actions, are frequently characterized by such extreme
lack of agreement, apathy or fear among members that only one member
may in fact initiate suit.'
It is generally said that legal title to the property and funds of an
unincorporated association is vested in the officers or trustees who hold
10. A.R. Barnes and Company v. Berry, 157 F. 883 (D.C. S.D. Ohio 1908); Ford
Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950).
11. See MECHEm, OUTLINES OF THE LAw OF AGENCY c. XVI (4th ed. 1952).
12. Rifkind, D. J., "It is true that there is a growing tendency to regard labor
unions, procedurally, as legal entities [See e.g., Fed. Rule 17(b)]. But these are devia-
tions from tradition. On the whole . . .. the unincorporated association is conceived of
as an aggregate of individuals, all of whom have to be joined in order to obtain relief
for or against the association. . . ." Tisa v. Potofsky, 90 F.Supp. 175, 180 (D.C. S.D.
N.Y. 1950). For a discussion see WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCORpORATED ASSoCIATIO NS 307
(1916).
13. Cf. McNalty y. Higgenbotham, 252 Ala. 218, 40 S.2d 414 (1949).
14. See note 12 supra.
15. Cf. O'Connor v. Harrington, 136 N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); .iodi-fied on rehearing, 285 App. Div. 908, 138 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1955) ;- WRIGHTINGTON Op cit.
supra note 12, at 241.
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for the benefit of the membership class,"8 but in spite of the fact that
often only a single member is willing to bring suit, no definition is at-
tempted of any separate property interest held by one individual member.
A difficult question is presented when only one or a few members ques-
tion the propriety of a particular appropriation. It has been said that
"each member of the local union has an interest in the entire assets and
property of the local . . ."1 yet on the other hand it is said that such
rights, rather than being held individually, are held jointly by the
".. . aggregate of individuals comprising the union, and this aggregate
properly sues through its representatives for the enforcement of their
joint or common rights."" Although the courts do not disagree in their
desire to do justice, these statements demonstrate the lack of precise defi-
nition of the nature and separability of property interests in union funds
which imposes unnecessary difficulties in the pleading of suit against
the defalcating official and unduly complicates the task of the court.
To qualify under the doctrine of parties by representation a "group"
right must be shown and not merely a multiple invasion by the officer of
individual rights such as the right to equal work opportunities." A
single union member may sue as a representative of the membership to
recover from the officer funds improperly expended or received but he
must allege in his complaint that he sues not only for himself, but also for
"all others similarly situated."2 If this is not done, some courts would
dismiss the suit on the ground that an individual member has no separate
interest in union funds.2 Even if a separate interest is recognized, other
obstacles must be met. In Seslar v. Union Local 9oi Inc.," a suit in
federal court, it was held that since the plaintiff did not allege that he
represented all other members of the unincorporated union, he must
represent only himself, and that the value of his individual property in-
terest in the union funds could be determined by dividing the funds by
the number of members. Since this amount came to less than the three
thousand dollar jurisdictional requirement, the case could not be heard in
federal court. The superficiality of the requirement of pleading that the
16. International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and Dis-
tillery Workers of America, C.I.O. v. Becherer, 142 N.J.Eq. 561, 61 A.2d 16 (1948)
Mursener v. Forte, 196 Or. 253, 205 P.2d 568 (1949).
17. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Kiser, 174 Va. 229, 65 S.E.2d 562, 125
A.L.R. 1251 (1940).
18. Tisa v. Potofsky, 90 F.Supp. 175, 180 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1950).
19. Atkins v. Fletcher, 65 N.J.Eq. 658, 55 At. 1074 (1903).
20. See note 12 supra.
21. McNalty v. Higginbothom, 252 Ala. 218, 40 S.2d 414 (1949); Ford v. Hou-
chins, 25 L.R.R.M. 2191 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas 1949) (dictum).
22. 186 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1951).
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plaintiff represdnts a class is apparent in O'Connor v. Harrington,2" where
every member of the local except the plaintiff had voted in favor of fi-
nancing an official's defense on a criminal charge. It was sufficient
that the plaintiff alleged that he represented a class even though no such
class existed.
DERIVATIVE SUIT ANALOGY
Many of these complexities are attributable to the tacit recognition
that the union local differs from other unincorporated associations such
as religious and fraternal organizations and that legal devices adequate
for the protection of the interests of members of these groups do not
adequately protect union members. For this reason, it is sometimes said
that the union members' suit is analogous to the shareholders derivative
action.2 By utilizing the analogy, the consequences of errors of pleading
and the absence of a "class" are minimized. In theory the two are at
odds since the shareholders' derivative action envisions the secondary en-
forcement by the shareholder of a property interest held by the corpora-
tion, while the union member's suit hinges on a primary property interest
enforced by a member of the class to which it belongs.25 Although the
purpose of the analogy is to clarify and alleviate procedural problems, it
has sometimes been carried to the unnecessary extreme of requiring that
the member male formal demand of the union executive committee prior
to bringing suit.2 ' The rigidity of'requiring such a demand has been ap-
preciably relaxed even in the classic derivative suit and imposing it here
merely further complicates an already cumbersome process. Naturally,
difficulties are encountered in extending an analogy from a well settled
theory, such as the derivative action, to a new area, such as the union
members' suit. However, since the use of an analogy admittedly -creates
a new body of law and does not merely extend the old, it need not em-
brace formal requirements such as demand in order to incur the desired
advantages.2 ' The attempt to equate the members' representative action
to the shareholders' derivative suit evidences a recognition of the in-
adquacies of the law of unincorporated associations as applied to the
unincorporated labor union. This body of law developed at a time when
local unions were similar to fraternal organizations and an infringement
23. 136 N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); modified on rehearing, 28-5 App. Div.
900, 138 N.Y.S.2d (1955).
24. Perkins, Protection of Labor Union Funds by Members Representative Suits:
Massachusetts Practice, 27 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1947); Wilson v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390, 250
S.W. 575 (1952).
25. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 24, at 16-18.
26. McNalty v. Higgenbotloin, 25 Ala. 218,. 40 So.2d 414 (1949).
27. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 24, at 17-21.
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of membership rights generally did not affect the livelihood of the in-
jured member. It is apparent that legal procedures originally designed
to protect interests such as the member's use of recreational facilities are
not adequate to safeguard his economic wellbeing. The utilization of the
derivative action analogy to alleviate these inadequacies requires the
tedious construction of a body of case law pertaining solely to members
rights in such "quasi-corporations." Much of the delay and uncertainty
attendant to such judicial construction could be avoided by legislative
action enumerating and clarifying the requirements of a union members'
suit.
TRUST FUND CONCEPT
Just as the doctrine of parties by representation and the shareholders
derivative action analogy fall short of affording complete satisfaction,
the addition of the "trust fund" concept only servise to multiply incon-
gruities. The official only holds "in trust" funds collected from the
members. Thus when funds are received from non-members, such as a
former employer who creates a fund to be used to benefit loyal em-
ployees, the individual member is generally at a loss to show that he holds
the "property" interest necessary for suit." In such a circumstance, the
only duty imposed on the administering official is one of honesty, and
unless a personal misappropriation of the fund can be shown, the mem-
ber is remediless. Even if the funds in question were collected from the
members it must be shown that they somehow became "union funds."
In Schimmel v. Messing,29 when the local by vote approved a testimonial
dinner, the dinner was advertised as being sponsored by the local; tickets
were sold to the members and the profits were split between two officers;
the members were denied recovery. Since the funds had never been de-
posited to the local's account it was held that they had never become the
property of the union, and hence the members could not show a personal
misappropriation of so-called "trust funds." If the officials in question
were in the true sense trustees, then it is well settled that the beneficiaries
could recover any profit made as a result of their position even though
the funds had never been earmarked or impressed with the trust. If the
official used his position to return a profit, no misapplication of trust
funds would need be shown." Likewise in Vaccaro v. Gentile,3 where
28. Geller v. Acwa Sportswear Manufacturing Company, 201 Misc. 381, 110
N.Y.S.2d 20 (1951) ; Jennings v. Jennings, 91 N.E.2d 899 (Oho Ct. of App. 1949).
29. 117 N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952) ; aff'd 306 N.Y. 841, 118 N.E.2d 904
(1954).
30. Cf. 3 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 492 (1946).
31. 138 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). Even though plaintiff failed to show
grounds for an accounting from the official, the court reasoned that plaintiff's counsel
NOTES
the union pension fund suffered severe losses because the trustees had
improperly invested in second mortgages and had financed an ill-fated
office building, the court refused to remove the official from office and
compel an accounting since no personal misappropriation by the officials
had been shown. If a showing of personal misappropriation must be
made, it is apparent that describing the official as a trustee contributes
no more than the two theories previously discussed.
On the other hand, it cannot be said that the courts' reluctance to
grant recovery in the absence of a showing of personal misappropriation
is totally unjustified, since denying the union official discretion in the
use of funds other than those set aside for long term security, such as
pensions, limits his ability to meet emergencies requiring expenditures.
Management representativs are in great part unbound in respect to the
funds at their command, hence union officials need certain discretionary
powers to keep equal footing.12  Imposing the requirement of a showing
of personal misappropriation serves to prevent a single member from
judicially blocking every expenditure on which the entire membership
does not agree. The membership could easily disagree on the advisability
of financing lobbying against proposed state labor legislation, and al-
lowing an individual member easy access to the courts and the delays of
litigation might render the question moot.
CONTRACT RIGHTS
In other instances, rather than focusing on the property interest, the
contractual rights of each individual member stemming from the con-
stitution and by-laws are emphasized.3 A suit on the contract is dis-
armingly appealing in its simplicity, since the only allegations and proof
necessary are an expenditure by the official not authorized by these
documents. However, defining the rights of the member in terms of
these instruments also focuses the court's attention on the duties they
had somehow benefitted the union, and granted plaintiff's counsel fees from the union's
general fund. On recovery of counsel fees, see Perkins, op. cit. supra note 24, at 27-28.
32. Summers, op. cit. supra note 4, at 816-20.
33. "Each member of the local union has an interest in the entire assets and
property of the local union. In addition, each member has a contractual right to have
the assets and property of the local union used only for those purposes set forth in the
constitution, and disbursed only in such manner as therein approved. Supplementary to
those is the further right to have the assets and property of the local union remain under
the control of both the local and national unions as such control is set forth and deline-
ated in the constitution and by laws." Seslar v. Union Local 901 Inc, 87 F. Supp. 447,
450 (D.C. N.D. Ind. 1949), reversed on other grounds, 186 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1951).
Recovery granted for funds received by official contra to constitution even though of-
ficials' open action showed no fraud intended. Local Union No. 720, International Hod
Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of America v. Bednarsek, 149 Colo.
586, 205 P.2d 796 (1949); Bianco v. Eisen, 190 Misc. 609, 75 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1944);
Duke v. Franklin, 177 Or. 297, 162 P.2d 141 (1945).
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impose upon members. Many union constitutions require the members
to exhaust internal remedies before resorting to the courts for relief, and,
in accord with their policy of non-interference with internal affairs of
unions, the courts have generally required compliance with such clauses ;"4
however, if a class action rather than one on the contract is brought, it
may be possible to argue that the requirement of exhaustion of internal
remedies pertains only to the enforcement of individual rights and not
group property interests. 5 In addition, the premature bringing of suit is
often expressly made a valid ground for disciplinary expulsion from the
union.3 6 Realizing the economic sdinction implied in the threat of expul-
sion, the lack of enthusiastic pursuit of the defalcating official is not
surprising." If the suit is prematurely brought and the member is ex-
pelled, since continued membership is required for standing to sue, the
expulsion can effectively deny the ex-member any future opportunity
to litigate the matter.""
Another weakness of suit on the contract is its inapplicability to the
recovery of funds from third persons to whom the official has improperly
paid them. The member must resort to an action for conversion, but
since proof of a property interest is required, the same theoretical barriers
re-appear.39 The contract theory lends itself to the recovery of funds
from the official himself but not from non-members to whom they have
been paid.4"
34. Way v. Patton, 195 Or. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1951) ; PERKINS op. cit. supra note 24,
at 22-27. But see Cosentino v. Goldman, 183 Misc. 539, 49 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1944) where
the court, in discussing the requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies, reasoned
that since the union constitution contained no express provision for obtaining an ac-
counting from the official by internal appeal, the member was jutsified in resorting
directly to the courts. 'However, it may be that if the member has never received a copy
of the constitution, he will not be bound by a provision requiring exhaustion of internal
appeal. Chew v. Manhattan Laundries, 134 N.J.Eq., 36 A.2d 205 (1944). A provision
calling for expulsion for the premature bringing of suit is not binding when passed
after the member has filed his bill. Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 177 N.J. Eq. 593, 177 Atl.
102 (1935).
35. Bell v. Sullivan, 183 Misc. 539, 89 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1944).
36. Burke v. Monumental Division No. 52, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
273 Fed. 707 (D.C. Md. 1919). Lesser acts such- as the making of false and libelous
statements against an officer may be grounds for expulsion. Hall v. Marion, 293 S.W.
435 (Mo. 1927); Ames v. Dubinsky, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
37. It has been said that officers are not liable to an erroneously expelled member
in the absence of a showing of fraud or bad faith. Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N.Y. 225,
109 N.E. 244 (1915).
38. Accord, Harris ex rel. Carpenter's Union No. 2573 of Marshfield Oregon,
Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. Bachman, 160 Or. 520, 86 P.2d 456 (1939) ; S.K.F.
Employees Association v. Root, 57 Pa. D. & C. 12 (1947).
39. Local No. 2618, Plywood and Veneer Workers of the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 85 P.2d 1116 (1938).
40. The right to recover from third persons is not absolute and must be viewed in
the light of agency principles as they apply between the official, the local, and third
persons. Third persons must be able to depend on the authority of the official to per-
NOTES
Aside from the difficulties which arise in choosing a theory toward
establishing a cause of action, the remedies available are not entirely satis-
factory. The court may compel an official to give an accounting to the
membership for the funds in his control, but the constitution and by-laws
may reduce the effectiveness of the remedy by requiring exhaustive ap-
peal through union channels prior to recourse to the courts.4 It may
also be difficult for a single member to prove that he as an individual
may compel an accounting." In Collins v. International Alliance of The-
atrical Stage Employees,4" although the court granted an injunction to
prevent future compulsion, an accounting for "kicked-back" funds was
denied since the member by submitting to the practice had somehow be-
come in pari delicto with the official as to the funds already paid. If it
can be shown that the official has made expenditures not authorized by
the constitution or by-laws, or has received funds to which he is not
entitled, he may be compelled to return them.44 Likewise, if it can be
shown that the official plans to improperly dissipate funds, a prohibitory
injunction may issue.45 Affirmative relief, however, is much more re-
luctantly granted. When the required property interest is alleged, there
has been a general willingness to grant recovery from third persons who
have received funds improperly paid over by the official,46 and in some
particularly flagrant cases, realizing that permitting the officer to stay
in office assures him an opportunity for retribution, the court may even
remove the errant official and appoint a receiver to conduct union af-
fairs until another election can be held. 7 However, others have indicated
that only negative relief is available and that unless the union constitu-
form acts of the general kind authorized by the constitution and by-laws, although the
specific act performed may be beyond his authority, such as purchasing specific land
for the local. Hartley v. United Mine Workers of America, Local Union No. 6321, 381
Pa. 430, 113 A.2d 239 (1955). Cf. Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union of America,
C.I.O., 380 Pa. 3, 109 A.2d 815 (1954).
41. See note 34 supra.
42. See McNalty v. Higgenbotham, 252 Ala. 218, 40 So.2d 414 (1949).
43. 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 182 Atl. 37 (1935).
44. Local Union No. 720, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common La-
borer's Union of America v. Bednarsek, 119 Colo. 586, 205 P.2d 796 (1949) ; Duke v.
Franklin, 177 Or. 297, 162 P.2d 471 (1945).
45. Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 136 S.W.2d 374 (1940); McCrae v.
Severino, 249 App. Div. 112, 291 N.Y.S. 303 (1936).
46. See Low v. Harris, 90 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Local No. 2508, Lumber and
Sawmill Workers v. Cairns, 197 Wash. 476, 85 P.2d 1109 (1938).
47. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 262 App. Div. 781, 27 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1941) ; 177 Misc. 35,
29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1941) ; 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941) ; 178 Misc. 965, 37
N.Y.S.2d 750 (1942). The receiver, if need be, may bring suit for the union to com-
pel the remaining officers to perform all acts necessary to keep the local functioning
during litigation. Mullins v. Merchandise Drivers Local No. 641, 120 N.J.Eq. 307, 185
Atl. 51 (1936). However, even after a receiver is appointed, a member may sue the
defalcating official for the union if the suit will not interfere with the performing of
the receiver's duties. Duke v. Franklin, 177 Or. 297, 162 P.2d 141 (1945).
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tion expressly so provides, the court is powerless to remove the funds of
the union from the hands of duly elected officials.48 It has been said
that even injunctive relief for a threatened unauthorized disposition of
funds will be denied if the official is adequately bonded.49
Of the available approaches, the contract theory provides the greatest
ease and certainty of relief. The contract right is admittedly individual
with each member and the quagmires of class action pleading are avoided.
If the member can show a disbursement not authorized by the constitu-
tion and by-laws, then relief will be granted, regardless of any attempt
by the executive board5" or majority of the local members5 ' to sanction
the expenditure.
In most instances there is a possibility, and in actions on the con-
tract a high probability, that the complaining member will be required
to exhaust the union appellate process prior to bringing suit ;52 however
considering the uncertainty of litigation, internal appeal may offer the
most expeditious means of rectification. 3 The constitution of the cen-
tral union, or articles of affiliation between the parent and local generally
reserve plenary powers to the president or board of the parent union to
deal with misconduct of local officials. The president usually is em-
powered to oust local officials and appoint a temporary receiver." The
48. Vaccaro v. Gentile, 138 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). The court re-
fused to remove the official even though he was in a position of conflict of interests
as a director of a corporation.
49. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 735 v. Kraft,
25 L.R.R.M. 2174 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1949); Ford v. Houchins, 25 L.R.R.M.
2191 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas 1949).
50. Local Union No. 720, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common La-
borer's Union of America v. Bednarsek, 119 Colo. 586, 205 P.2d 796 (1949); Stein-
miller v. McKeon, 21 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
51. Low v. Harris, 90 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1937); O'Connor v. Harrington, 136
N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) ; modified on rehearing, 285 App. Div. 900, 138
N.Y.S.2d 285 (1955).
52. See note 34 supra.
53. Another disability suffered by the individual member appears when suit is at-
tempted by one member against the entire local. It is said that the member may not
sue the local since his identity is merged with that of the local; rather, he must join
each member who participated individually. Cf. Marchitto v. Central R.R. Co. of New
Jersey, 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952).
54. Suspension not valid if not for one of grounds listed in union constitution,
Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1948) ; expulsion held valid, Margolis
v. Burke, 53 N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945). There is a strong indication that a
union tribunal may remove an officer on grounds which might not be sufficient to war-
rant a court to do so. George Meany, A.F.L.-C.I.O. president, regarding the A.F.L.-
C.I.O. Executive Council's removal of Dave Beck as an A.F.L.-C.I.O. vice president and
council member said, "Whether he [Beck] has violated any laws, state or Federal, deal-
ing with theft, misappropriation or embezzlement, is not for us to consider or deter-
mine ..... .Whether Beck stole the funds or borrowed them, the record shows he took
advantage of his position as a trade union official to use money belonging to dues-
paying members for his own personal gain and profit." Indianapolis Star, May 21, 1957,
p. 3, col. 4.
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local membership may petition the president to remove an official,55 but
the president may cause removal at his own instance, even over the ob-
jection of local members if he feels summary action is warranted. "6 The
constitution may entitle the president to compel an accounting of the
local official for local funds in his control.5 The official may be ex-
pelled, 8 removing any possibility of holding office in the future and the
president may consolidate the local with another for more satisfactory
supervision.59
The availability of these means of immediate relief makes the in-
ternal appeal appear to be more advantageous to the complaining member
55. Leventhal v. Jennings, 311 Mass. 622, 42 N.E.2d 595 (1942).
56. Cf. Way v. Patton, 195 Or. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1951). But see Sullivan v.
McFetridge, 55 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945), where international president was
denied an accounting when the local had re-elected the expelled local president. It was
said that the re-election caused the supervision of the international to end.
57. Grand Lodge of International Association of Machinists v. Reba, 97 Conn. 235,
116 Atl. 235 (1922). In the absence of such a clause, the president's only alternative is
a suit as representative of a class. However, he cannot represent the members of the
local, for he is not a member of that class. United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America v. Dickerson, 102 A.2d 921 (Del. 1954); McLane v. Romano, 372
Ill. App. 700, 54 N.E.2d 715 (1944). If he sues as a representative of the international,
then he must show that the international has some property interest in the local funds.
However, it is usually said that the international has no such property interest, rather
the dues called for in the international charter give the international rights in the nature
of an account receivable. Duris v. Iozzi, 6 N.J. Super. 530, 70 A.2d 793 (1949) ; Inter-
national Union Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and Distillery Workers of America,
C.I.O. v. Becherer, 142 N.J. Eq. 561, 61 A.2d 16 (1948). When the international con-
stitution states that on disaffiliation, local funds become the property of the inter-
national, and the local does disaffiliate, then the international has a property interest
in the local funds. Harker v. McKissock, 7 N.J. 323, 81 A.2d 480 (1951). Such for-
feiture clauses must be express and will not be implied. Grand Lodge of International
Association of Machinists v. Reba, 97 Conn. 235, 116 Atl. 235 (1922). In the absence
of a forfeiture clause, the local keeps its funds on disaffiliation. Local 1140 v. United
Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, 232 Minn. 217, 45 N.W.2d 408, 23
A.L.R. 1197 (1950). Even an express forfeiture clause may not be operative if the
international revokes the charter of the local. Grand Lodge v. Reba, supra; but cf.
Mursener v. Forte, 196 Or. 253, 205 P.2d 568 (1949). If the locals are dependent
rather than affiliated with the international, it has been said that all members of all
locals have a property interest in the funds of each dependent local. Harker v. Mc-
Kissock, 1 N.J. Super. 510, 62 A.2d 405 (1948). It has been intimated that even though
no property interest of the international could be found in the funds of a disaffiliating
local, a contract action might lie against the local for breach of the implied promise of
loyalty to the international. Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1948). The classification of the right of the parent as an account receivable is widely
accepted. Therefore, an attachment would not lie against the property of the local to
satisfy a judgment against the central union. Local No. 500 Brotherhood of Painters,
Decorators and Paper Hangers of America v. Wise, 269 S.W.2d 271 (Ky. 1954) ; but it
may be that the debt owed the parent union by the local for dues could be the subject
of a garnishment action. See Varnado v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933).
58. Margolis v. Burke, 53 N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945). Realizing the im-
portance of unions to economic life, it has been held that a union official has a property
right in his office (even though non-paying) and that he may sue to recover it when
wrongfully removed. Bianco v. Eisen, 190 Misc. 609, 75 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1944).
59. Cf. Cameron v. Durkin, 321 Mass. 59, 74 N.E.2d 671 (1947).
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than attempted litigation, and such is probably the case. On the other
hand, invoking the exercise of such untrammeled discretion invites its
abuse. Removing the control of the local from its elected officials and
delegating it to an appointee incurs the risk of further inequities. The
duration of the receivership may be unnecessarily prolonged, the op-
portunity for elections denied, and defalcations multiplied."0 Although
the supervisory powers of the parent union enable expeditious removal
of a local official from his position, thus eliminating his opportunity for
retribution over the complaining members, these powers may also enable
the parent union to seize complete control. The local then must resort
to the courts and, by showing that the necessity for supervision has ended,
request removal of the parent union's receiver and the holding of elec-
tions.6 ' Although in all probability, internal appeal offers the most
effective and equitable means of settling union affairs, hazards also re-
sult from bringing unrest in the local to the attention of the parent union.
CONCLUSIONS
The high degree of public interest, as well as the severity of the pro-
cedural barriers which presently limit the protection afforded member's
interests in union funds, argue in favor of immediate action to alleviate
these handicaps. Realizing that requiring the exhaustion of internal
remedies serves to prevent the undue restriction of the offiicals' activi-
ties, this requirement should be maintained. However, once internal
remedies have been exhausted, or on a showing that internal appeal would
be futile or involve unreasonable delay, effective judicial relief should be
available. The present barriers to litigation are a result, not of a desire
to handicap the member, but rather of conceptual difficulties resulting
from historical development. The major problem facing the courts in
each case is not deciding whether recovery should be allowed, but de-
liberating the propriety of the theory advanced. It is this conceptual
impasse which makes the courts' role difficult and which could be recti-
fied by legislation.
Since in each case, regardless of the theory advanced, an expenditure
which is not authorized by the constitution or by-laws must be shown,
and since each member has an admittedly individual contract right to pre-
60. See Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 136 S.W.2d 374 (1940); Dusing v.
Nuzzo, 262 App. Div. 781, 27 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1941); 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882
(1941); 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941); 178 Misc. 965, 37 N.Y.S.2d 750
(1942).
61. O'Neill v. United Association of Journeymen Plumbers and Steam Fitters of
United States and Canada, 348 Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944). However, such action
raises the risk that the president may disciplinarily suspend or expel the entire
local. Biller v. Egan, 290 Ill. App. 219, 8 N.E.2d 205 (1937) ; O'Neill v. United As-
sociation of Journeymen Plumbers, supra.
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vent or recover expenditures not authorized by these documents, a statu-
tory prescription adopting the contract theory in these cases would render
arguments concerning the "property" rights of individual members aca-
demic. Likewise, the pleading and proof requirements of the contract
theory lend themselves to more efficient litigation.62 Only in a suit to
recover funds from a non-member is proof of a "property" interest neces-
sary, and it is in reference to the handicap attendant to suits against non-
members that those who argue for legislative action present their strong-
est case.
Although future litigation might provide the opportunity for judi-
cial clarification of the elements of the member's cause of action against
the official and the recipients of unauthorized disbursements of funds, a
realistic examination of the detriments presently suffered by members of
unincorporated unions, as well as a realization of the interrelationship of
this question with that of the degree of governmental supervision to
which labor unions are to be subjected, argues in favor of legislative
action. Such legislation should provide that once internal remedies have
been exhausted, or on a showing that internal appeal is futile or involves
unreasonable delay, any member or group of members of an unincorpor-
ated union should have immediate access to the courts. On showing an
application of funds not authorized either expressly or by implication by
the union constitution and by-laws, a recovery for the benefit of the
union from the official who improperly applied them, or from a third
person to whom they have been paid63 should be granted, and the member
reimbursed from such funds for costs and attorney's fees.
62. The language of contract lends itself to other litigation involving local unions.
See Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Pic-
ture Operators of the United States and Canada, 118 N.J.Eq. 11, 176 Ati. 692, 97 A.L.R.
594 (1935); where the court stated that a constitutional provision calling for racial
discrimination was void as against public policy and a Negro member could not have
assented to such an illegal clause by joining the union. Likewise it has been said that
a clause making criticism of union officials grounds for expulsion would be unenforce-
able. Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1948) (dictum).
/ 63. In some cases, the official has already been held personally liable for losses
suffered by third persons, such as injury caused by the official's failure to properly
maintain a building belonging to the union; Marion v. Chandler, 81 S.E.2d 89 (W. Va.
1954) ; and illegal acts of pickets employed by the official; Local Union No. 313, Hotel
and Restaurant Employees International Alliance v. Staltrokis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S.W.
450 (1918) (dictum); however not an implied warranty of fitness or honesty of an
employee sent under a closed shop hiring hall contract, Aldmon v. Consolidated Garage
Corp., 194 Misc. 793, 87 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1949).
